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Abstract: Since the notion of typicality (graded structure) was frrst proposed,several
of its possible determinants have been identified. Moreover, the distinction ·between
common taxonomic categories and goal-derived categories has beenparalleledwitha
suggested difference in their respective sources of typicality ("central tendency" and
"ideal"). Building on this, previous studies using face materiaIs have foundevidencefor
a goal-derived nature of typicality in the domain of facial expressions of emotion. The
work presented is partly aimed at assessing the generality of these conclusions •• by
resorting to emotion-words (vs. faces). On the otherpart, it purports tohighlight the
relations of "ideals" and "central tendency" to intensity as a major dimensiollofboth
felt and expressed emotions. Outcomes found point to a linear relation betweenintensity
~atings and "typicality-as-ideal" in ali cases, and to a differentiated pattem of relations
between both and "central tendency" (indexed on the basis of a multidimensional
scaling measure), varying across emotion categories.
00 indices and terminology
The first issue to be dealt with concems terminology. We will be using the· following
variable names: "typicality", "central tendency", and "ideal". Each ofthese tenns obeys
a general definition, but they alI allow for different meanmgs according to the COl1crete
procedures in use to collect quantified indices. We wili thus start by specifying .the
procedures we used and their supporting rationale, and by additionally comparing them
to those employed by Hortsmann (2002) in a study with a similar scope conceming
faces.
Tipicality
ln its most general sense, stemming from Rosh pioneering studies (1973; 1975),
typicality refers to a graded structure undetlying category membership as well as
category non-membership. For example, "robin" is a 'better (typical) member of the
"birds" category than "ostrich"; on the other lland, "dog" is a better (typical) non-
member ofthe category "fishes" than "whale".
At least two main types of questions coo be used to elicit typicality judgments, wlúch
are not equivalent (Barsalou, 1985). The first one directly asks subjects about "how
typical" an exemplar is; as Barsalou points out, this may incline them to emphasize
. "frequency of instantiation" (i.e, how often 811 exemplar occurs as an inst811tiation of the
category). The second one asks subjects about "how good-an-example" 811 exemplar is;
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it is, according to Barsalou, freer from e~p~asis on specific determinants oftypicality.
It coo be seen that the assessment of typlCallty suffers from ambiguities,and:thatthese
ambiguities depend on the kind of determinants on which typic;a1ity 'judgments are
based upon.
The subjeets in our study had to rate "how suitable" eaeh word-exemplarwas to
represent a given emotion. This is not so far from the "goodnessof exemplar"
instructions: we will eall it, more specifieally, "representativeness"instructions.. As\will
become clear below, this also elosely matches what Horstmann callsan •. "ideal"
dimension (2002, 299).
Central Tendency (CT)
Family resemblance has been traditionally considered the major detenninootof
typicality (Rosch ood Mervis, 1975). It coo be envisaged from different angles,;oneof
them being as alI sorts of "central tendency" information in a kin-statistical sense· (e.g.,
mode, median, mean, etc.). The conlerstone of tlús standpoint isthe interehangeability
between an exemplar's similarity to central tendency ood its average similarity toalLfue
other members ofthe category (Barsalou, 1983).
Horstmann has embraeed this operational understooding of familyresemblanceasa
distooce to CT in his paper. Given that the stimuli used in his study were drawings.of
five facial expressions varying across five leveIs of intensity, CT scor~s wereobtained
by having participants to judge the similarity of a11 pairs of faceswithineachemotion
category: the average similarity of each face to alI the other category memberswas tllen
taken as an index of CT (Horstmann, 2002, 299-300). This is just one possibleway of
acknowledging the fWlction~ equivalence between average similarity to members ood
similarity to their central tendency. It is also entirely dependent on explicit judgment
and on the assumption of a one-dimensional continuum of similarity.
The CT indices we used were obtained differently. On the basis of the number of times
each pair of emotion-words in a category has been jointly attributed to that category by
a number of subjeets (n = 66), an input matrix of proximities was built up (i.e., one for
each emotion category). This matrix, interpreted as a matrix of similarity between word
pairs, was then treated through multidimensional scaling (Proxcal) constrained toa
single dimensiono The normalized coordinates of that dimensiol1, withzero as its central
point, offer an alternative index of distance to CT or "family resemblooce". Thechoice
of constr~ining the MDS' solution to one dimension introduces of course an "arbitrary
element. Mostly, it was decided on the fo11owing reasons: (1).to keep upwith the one-
dimensional assumption of usual measures af CT; (2) to offer some means of evaluating
it, basically trough checking the intetpretability of the one-axis solution; (3) to affera
provisional unified framework aeross different emotions.
Ideal.
Generally, it can be defined as 811Y property, characteristic ar dimension that 00
exemplar must possess ill order to accomplish a' goal associated with its category. As
such, it may also offer a basis for graded, structure (typieality). Barsalau exemplifies
with «zero ealories» as a11 ideal for the category «foods to eat 011 a diet» (1985, 63~). ln
practice, there may be more than one ideal for eaeh category; the typical questio11 to be
asked is how much (what amount) ofthe ideal is present in tlle exemplar.
The "ideal" scores in Horstmann study were obtained by asking subjects how suitable to
express a given emotion a given facial expression was. The idea -Iying behind is ~hat
"expressing emotion" constitutes .the tacit gaaI served by facial expressions of emotion.
(Horstmmm, 2002, 299). With minor differences i11 phrasing, it cml be 110ticed the elose
correspolldellce to the question we used to assess typicality, which means that we won't
be 'handling in our study separate measures of "typicality" and "ideal", but just a single
"typicality-as-ideal" index. ln fact, differently from Horstmann, the goalof:our· study
was not to find the source of typicality in the domain of emotion expressionsbutto
explicitly address the relations of "tipicality as ideal"· and CT with' intensityas .~major
dimension of felt and expressed emotions.
Besides "ideal" and CT scores, a "frequency measure" was also collected.Fôllowing
Barsalou, it is important to distinguish between "familiarity", which is.a.category-
independent measure, and "frequency of instantiation" (FI), applyingto"how;,often
someone experiences an entity as an instance of a category (Barsalou, 1985, 631). In\his
work, Horstmann resorted to overt questioning about FI (2002,299). 'The)particular
"frequency" measure we used was the l1umber of times oneword .exemplarwas
attributed to a given emotion-category. This index shares with FI the .propertyofi'being
category-specific. However, it doesn't correspond to a specific judgment •. over
frequency. Given that there may exist large differences between people estimates.about
00 exemplar's FI and the number of times it is attributed to the associated:category,
these two measures are hardly comparable; for that reason, no accountwillbeigiven
here of the results found for "frequency". .
Goal-derived and common taxonomic categories.
The distinction between taxonomic and goal-derived categories has roots irttheworkof
Barsalou (1983) on ad hoc categories. These later are, constructed to'achieve,novel
goals, and correspond therefore to labile structures not yet estab~shed in memory.They
can nevertheless become engrained through use; as a result, goal-derived ·categories
encompass both ad hoc and former ad hoc categories ,whose primary function is alI the
sarne to serve a goa1.
Just like taxonomic categories, goal-derived ones exhibit graded structure,so the
question arises as to the detenninants of typicality being different or the sarne for both
types. Adding to a number of reasons (mainly of a functional nature) to expect them do
be different, Barsalou has gathered evidence for a privilege of cr in usual taxonomic
categories and of ideais in goal-derived ones (1983; 1985; 1987). These fmdingsare
however to be tempered with the followmg observations (1) a graded structuremay.be
simultaneously determined by tnore than one factor; (2) the determinants ofaparticular
graded structure coo change with context; (3) rather than reflecting invariant structures
associated with categories, typicality seems to reflect people's ability to construct
concepts (cí. Barsalou, 1985; 1989).
To sum up, although we may distinguish ideaIs and CT on grourid of their favored
association with different types of categories, there is no way of settingup· a clear-cut
boundary. The same happens with the very distinction between common taxonomic and
goal-derived categories, which allows for no. definite frontier. As orienting guidelines,
Barsalou proposes the foIlowing differences: (1) common taxonomic categories are
based on cIusters of cO-OCCurritlg properties and thus·reflect the correlational structure
of the environment, while goal-derived categories (such as "things to take on a
jounley") usuaIIy don't; (2) common taxonomic categories are often used.to cIassify or
represent kinds of entities, while goal-derived categories are nonnalIy used to achieve
goaIs (such as in plarming); (3) common taxonomic categories are highly familiar
categories, with a biological or artifactual origin, well estabIished 1nto cultural
knowledge, while goal-derived ones are not necessarily soo
The Horstmann study (2002)
The study by Horstmann embodies a different Iogic from those of Barsalou, who aimed
at demonstrating that ideaIs can determine graded structure; for that, he used
specifically tailored goaI-derived categories that he contrasted 'against well-known
taxonomic categories. Horstmmm, on his tum, deaIs with a single preexisting category
(facial expressions of emotion), which may qualify as a common taxonomic as weIl as a
goaI-derived category in light of the above-presented guidelines. The issue at stake was
whether, on the basis of the observed determinants of typicality (namely "ideaIs" or
CT), a decision could be made regarding the nature of the category (Horstmann, 2002,
298). The author concluded, on analysis, that ideal and not CT determined typicality,
implying that categories of facial expressions are goal-derived in nature. This
conclusion should of course be Iooked at carefully, considering the warnings about a
flexible use of determinants and the potentially hybrid character of some categories,
One important issue in the Horstmann study concerns the role of intensity and its
relation to the CT index. This index 11as been computed, following Barsalou, asan
average of the similarity ratings obtained by each exemplar after being paired with each
of the other exemplars in the category. Given the perceptive salience of intensity in the
particular materials used - schematic drawings of facial expressions varying in intensity
- it is no surprise that CT corresponds to median intensity exemplars, while "ideal"
varies linearly with intensity. The point to be made is that a less perceptual1y
constrained siniilarity measure, made possible by resorting to other emotion-expressive
materiaIs, could furnish different results. A different way of 60mputing the CT index, in
the spirit of "mental maps" embodied by MDS teclmiques, might also be helpful on this
regard.
Also, as Horstmmm himself acktlowledges, his stimuli materials are entirely made up
with pure emotional expressions, excluding blends. This is something that can only be
achieved with faces, and would be higIlly implausible with words. A possible
consequence is that, if we tum out to facial blends, or to materiaIs such as lexicon, we
might get increases in intensity accompanied by decrements in typicality.
The empírica! study that follows can be partly conceived as an assessment of the
generality of Horstmann results in the domam of emotion expressions (not just facial
ones). More centrally, however, its goaI" shifts away from the issue of typicality to
specifical1y address the ,relations of intensity, as a central dimension of felt and
expressed emotions, to CT and ideals across different emotions.
Empirical study
Method
Two groups of graduate students at the University of Coimbra were used as participants
in this study, for a total of 111 subjects.
Qne of the groups (n = 66) was presented with a long list of emotion-words vertically
spread over a booklet (rows) that also contained at its top the names of seven discrete
emotions (columns). The instructions asked subjects to rate, using a 1-6 scale, "how
suitable a given word-exemplar was to expre'ss a given emotion". Besides. the nam·es of
the seven emotions (happiness; fear, anger, sadness, disgust, surprise and love), 3n
additional column entitled "not suitable to any emotion" allowed subjects to make that
choice. There were no constraints imposed as to the number of emotions to which a
given word could be attributed. The data collected this way were used for obtaining two
indices: the "typicality-as-ideal" index, 011 the basis of the ratings made (mean ratings),
and the CT index, based on the matrixes of joint attribution of each pair of words to a
same emotional category, irrespective oí their ratillgs. Even if they come out ofthe
same pool oí data, these indexes put in value different kinds of information amenable
to different kinds oí treatments. . '
Subjects in the second group (n =,45) had to rate, in a similar 1-6 format scalethe
intensity of emotion conveyed by each word-exemplar. Words were organized 'into
separate sheets according to their respective emotion categories, with the·nameofthe
category printed on topo Instructions explicitly required subjects to ratetheintensity of
the specified emotion as expressed by the words below i1. These datawere'usedto
compute the intensity scores (mean ratings for each word within a category).
Results
Tables 1 ood 2 summarize the functional relations of intensity to CT and Idealindices
for two pairs of emotions (Happiness, Sadness; Fear, Anger). The two top rows on each
table correspond to different ways oí plotting CT in tlle horizontalaxis- ·either
accounting for the sign of the coordinates (upper row) or altematively reflecting their
absolute distooce to the center ("zero" shifted towards left). The bipolarity allowedfor
in the first case can be helpful as a check on the ulterpretabilijy of the one-dimensional
solution, while the absolute distance to CT offers a more comparable picturewiththe
common CT measures. The pattemsexhibited by emotions in the leftcolumn
(Happiness ood Fear) are quite similar in both tables, ood differ from the ones presented
on righ1. Given that results for "Aversion" ood "Surprise" share the same.pattern with
Happiness ood Fear they were omitted here.
The fIrSt major outcome to be noticed is the invariable linear relation betweenintensity
ood "typicality-as-ideal" across alI emotions. That can be seen through lookingat ,the
bottom rowon both tables ood checking the· ANOVAs associated with the fit of the
linear model (highly significoot in alI cases). This result converges with thefmdings
reported by Horstmann using faces; moreover, sUlce it is in no way restricted to "pure
expressions" (00 unattaulable ideal when dealing with word materiaIs) it goes one step
further in tying up "intensity" to "typicality-as-ideal". On the basis oí this outcome, it
can be suggested that emotion expression is by nature an intensive dimension; it also
seems sound to expect .:fuat tlle use oí ~lends oí facial expressions in forthcoming
studies will not significantly alter this picture (which remains to be seen).
The second general outcomeconcems the differences occurring between emotions.
While the relation between intensity and ideal favors uniíorm'behavior across emotional
categories, things go differently when it comes to the relation between intensity andCT.
This is best illustrated by the second row in both tables, were two opposite pattems can
be observed. While for Happiness and Fear' (left column, tables 1 and 2) intensity
decreases dramatically with absolute distance to CT (ac'cording to a power best fit), for
Sadness ood Anger, on the contrary, it shows a linear increase. This result points
towards a twofold nature oí emotional categorization. ln some cases, CT (indexed by
"zero" on the abscissa) appears to be closely related with intensity and ideal; on some
others, it strongly diverges from both. The top row inTable l'makes that clear through
the symmetrical quadratic adjustments (collcave downward for Happiness, an upward
for Sadness). On Table 2, Anger shows a descending linear pattern, which can be
looked upon as just another of way of making intensity diverge from CT (in fact, a
slightly quadratic fit proved better than the linear one, but depellded on a singleright
extreme pOUlt)
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Table 2
Functional relations ofIntensity Scores to CT an Ideal:
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Table 3
Functional relations between CT (absolute distance) and Ideal:
comparative pattems for all six emotions
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Table 3 presents the ftmctional pattems relating "typicality-as-ideal"ío ,.absolute
distance ~~m C! for alI the specific .emoti?ns con~idered.' As. could be anticipatedfrom
the prevailmg linear bond between mtenslty ood Ideal, alI s1D1ilarities811ddifferences
ascertained were replicated by replacing intensity for "ideal" on the .0rdinate~'The
contrast between the bottom row ood the two upper rows on the tableclearlyillustrates
the prevíously found distinction among Sadness ood Anger, on one side, andtheother
four emotions. Furthermore, for the majority of emotions, the samebest ,'powerfit
observed with intensity could also be reproduced with "ideal" on the ordinate.'
Final conclusions
As a general conelusion, it can be said that the intensive nature of "typicality'~as-.ideal"
is clearly entailed by these results. There is, on this -regard, a close agreementwith
Horstmann findings. However, they do not support the implication that idealalone
determines the graded structure of emotion expression categories. ln fact,four <ofilie
emotional categories envisioned showed maximum intensity ood maximum ideal scores
near the "central tendency", while two of them exhibited a clear dissociationbetween
"ideal" and "central tendency". The role p1ayed by CT seems thereforeto·vary:with
different emotions, leaving aside the possibi1ity of clearly' deciding whetheremotion
expressions are structured like common taxonomic or g.oal-derived categories. .
This disagreement with Horstmann results is plausibly due, on ilieoneside,<to
differences in the stimlili materiais and, on the other side, to the CT 'Índices employed.
On the whole, we take our CT index, obtained through' an MDS solution, as ,more in.
accordance with the comp1exities of the. notion of similarity t11811 the usualaverage
simi1arity seore (Rips, 1989). By making possible to obtain a CT measure freer from the
saliel1t perceptual or cognitive dimension that stands for 00 "ideal"~,amore complex
picture of the joint role of CT and "ideal-intensity" coo emerge. ln particular, it canbe
conceived that intensive aspects concerned with ideals must becombinedwith more
"taxonomic" ones, depel1dent on different dimensions, to support emotional
categorizing.
The interpretability of the one-dimensional solution used for CT was only approached
in broad heuristic terms~ Neverthe1ess, for Saclness and Anger there seemed to exist
simple satisfactory interpretations, resting on a "passivity-.activity" dimension (sp1een..
despair) for the [ast, and on a "high-Iow intensity" dimension for the second one (in
fury-annoyed). The other four emotions provided less clear pictures (however, in most
cases, the use of bi-dimensional solutions offered plausib1e interpretations). As stated
before, the one-dimensional approach was meant as a tentative exploratory step' to
altemative CT indexes. To adV811Ce furtller within tlus 10gic tlle dimensional solutiol1S
must'be worked out frrst for each emotion and the computation of CT made afterwards
in accordance.
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